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NOTE AND COMMENT.
THn RIGHT OF PRIVACY AT COMMON LAW.-It is quite evident that the
question as to whether there is a right of privacy at common law must be.
met by the courts in most of our states in the not distant future, unless indeed
the right is created or declared by the legislatures. The latter course has been
followed in the state of New York, whose legislature in i9o3 passed an act
"to prevent the unauthorized use of the name or picture of any person for the,
purposes of trade." (Chapter 132 of the Laws of New York of 19o3, page
308.) This act makes persons offending against it, guilty of misdemeanor, and
liable, in civil actions, in damages, to persons injured by such violations of
the statute. The Court of Appeals of New York in 19o8, in the case of
Rhodes v. Spcrry & Hutchinson Co., 193 N. Y. 223, 85 N. R. i097, declared that
this statute violated neither the federal nor the state constitution. The same
court in i902, in Roberson v. Rochester, etc., Co., i71 N. Y. 539, 64 N. E. 442,
by a vote of four to three, had held that the rijht of privacy did not exist at
common law in the state of New York. The act referred to was passed at the
very next session, perhaps, upon the suggestion to that end made by PAcMM,
C. J., in the opinion of the majority of the court in the Roberson case, supra,
certainly in response to a growing demand for a greater regard for the
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decencies of life. This Roberson case was the first in which any court of last
resort had been compelled to squarely decide whether or not the common law
recognizes a right of privacy. It is unfortunate that the one additional vote
needed to make into a majority of the court, the minority which, in an able
dissenting opinion, declared for the existence of the right, was not forthcoming. The history of this question from the time when it was first placed
prominently before the country in I8go, by Messrs. S. D. Warren and L. D.
Brandeis in an article in 4 HARv. L. Rzv. 193, down to i9o5, when the case of
Pavesich v. N. E. Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 19o, 5o S. E. 68, was decided, has
already been traced in this RPMMW, Vol. 3, P. 559. In that case the Supreme
Court of Georgia held unanimously that the right does exist at common law.
Thus the matter rested, so far as courts of last resort are concerned, until
.last summer, when two other state courts of final appeal passed upon the
question. In Henry v. Cherry & Webb (I99), - R. I. -, 73 Atl. 97, upon
facts not unlike thpse in the Pavesich case, supra, in an unanimous opinion,
the existence of such a right at common law was denied. The conclusion was
based mainly upon the grounds that until the Pavesich case was decided, the
right had never been admitted by a court of authority, that while something
like the right of privacy, the "right to be let alone," had been judicially
asserted in many cases, it had always been in connection with a right of property, or in cases in which slander or libel were the gist of the action, and
that no property question is involved in this alleged right. It is an elaborately
argued and very able opinion, following the brief for the defendants somewhat closely, but it is narrow and technical and certainly does not present
that view of the elasticity and adaptability of the common law of which we
are so fond of boasting.
In Poster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn (i9op), - Ky. -, i2o S. W. 364, Chinn
brought action against the Foster Co., which manufactured a patent medicine,
for printing in its advertising matter, his picture and a copy of a spurious
letter purporting to have -been signed by him recommending the medicine.
The opinion in the case contains references to this publication as libellous,
but the decision is clearly based not upon the theory of libel, but of an invasion of the right of privacy. The court says (120 S. W. 366) "While there is
some conflict in the authorities, we concur with those holding that a person is
entitled to the right of privacy as to his picture, and that the publication of
the picture without his consent * * * is a violation of the right of privacy,
and entitles him to recover without proof of special damages;" citing the
Pavesich case, supra.
It may well be doubted whether legislative declaration and definition of
this right will prove as satisfactory, especially under rapidly changing conditions, as will the judicial recognition of the right. The narrowness and
H. M. B.
rigidity of the New York statute are apparent.
LiMIATION 01 A CARRIER'S LIAITY roa NmiauoNc.-This is one of the
subjects which never seems to be set at rest. In making contracts,'shipper and
carrier do not stand upon an equality. The shipper cannot exist without the

